

Negotiating Democracy and Religious Pluralism

India, Pakistan, and Turkey

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Itineraries of Democracy and Religious Plurality

Karen Barkey, Sudipta Kaviraj, and Vatsal Naresh

I.1 Introduction

This volume focuses on the relation between the functioning of democracy and the prior existence of religious plurality in three societies outside the West: India, Pakistan, and Turkey. The existing literature on “the spread of democracy” relies primarily on the power or the example of the West for democratic government to spread to other societies. The intellectual and sociocultural traditions of specific societies are rarely analyzed in detail. Often discussions of democracy examine how individual religious traditions relate to the demands of democratic politics: is Islam or Hinduism conducive to or compatible with democracy? The central question we seek to address in this volume is different. Democracy is centrally concerned with political pluralism in many ways. Democratic procedures of collective decision-making presuppose a social condition in which different, often conflicting social interests press a plurality of demands on the state. Constitutional features of democracy—like freedom of expression and association—contribute to a situation where the those who exercise power lack the capacity to stamp out different points of view. It is only recently that Western European countries have had to recognize and rethink the role of religious and ethnic pluralism in the unfolding of democratic decision-making. In many non-Western countries, adaptation to democratic politics has meant struggling with the legacy of historical religious pluralism since before modern states were established.

Early scholars of democracy primarily examined divergences of constitutional legal design—presidential or parliamentary forms, or federal or unitary structures—across a range of countries in the modern West that were similar in the sociological composition of their electorates, and had similar historical traditions drawn from the settlement of Westphalia. In sociological terms, these states were relatively homogeneous: some were so as a result of the powerful, coercive, violent processes following the rise of the modern state system. This settlement encouraged the creation of religiously unified polities. In the nineteenth

century, these states developed strong nationalist sentiments around a single language, religion, culture, and history—all included in the standard definitions of the nation-state. As modernization theory became dominant after the Second World War, the non-Western world was deemed both more backward and bound to follow in the footsteps of the West through sheer cultural imitation (see, for example, Apter 1965; Geertz 1963; Lerner 1958; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967). As a project, the study of democracy now has to deal with a much wider and consequently more diverse world; the present challenge of democratic government is far more complex. Academic research in the past decades has gradually formed a picture of democratic systems that is more critical and has expanded its study to a larger variety of cases. Consequently, explaining variations in democratic experience requires close attention to the sociological structure of each society in which democratic politics operates, and to the historical traditions of political life. This volume contributes to this new line of enquiry into comparative politics with a deeper critical historical understanding.

In parallel, scholars of religious history and intellectual historians have also questioned the Enlightenment conception of religious traditions as merely superstitious and uniformly exclusivist. The concisely simple philosophy of history that underpinned traditional studies of politics saw the rise of European modernity as the emergence of a uniquely rationalistic civilization that spread intellectual enlightenment and introduced ideas of human dignity against other religious cultures that were discriminatory and intolerant. Comparative historical sociology today is obliged to reopen these assumptions and re-examine questions about the historical trajectories of politics in different parts of the world. As it has embarked on this analysis of varieties of historical trajectories and conceptions of religious history, comparative historical sociology has pioneered a richer and more capacious field of study. This collection of chapter represents the extension of such an expansion of the fields of study linking religious traditions to political outcomes.

In the countries of interest, Turkey, India, and Pakistan, religious pluralism was part of successful accommodation in the past. Under new political arrangements, religious pluralism has come under severe threat. With the rise of majoritarian domination, the future of pluralism, tolerance, and democratic norms is in peril. It is this particular theoretical and comparative concern, from the transition to modern statehood to the present day, that has directed the work of this volume. In this introduction, we begin by discussing critical theoretical and methodological issues that such comparative historical work should address. We then present the historical arcs of Pakistan, India, and Turkey before their transition to modern statehood to serve as a framing tool for the chapters in the volume. Finally, we speak to a series of contemporary questions that present themselves through the analysis of the three cases.

I.2 Concepts

Social science analysis of historical processes like the establishment of democratic government or religious change and secularization—the two processes this volume is concerned with—must use a preformed language of social science theory. Its central concepts, such as calling economic changes “capitalist industrialization,” or labeling religious transformations “secularization,” are predominantly drawn from analytical reflections on nineteenth-century European history—the only theater of serious social science discussion at that time. One of the major problems of modern social science is the way such theoretical constructs are used for comparative historical analysis. In the first stage of the development of social science, historical disciplines engaged in two kinds of cognitive and epistemic activities: first, empirical descriptions of social processes, followed by the production of theoretical constructs as such empirical information accumulated and became more elaborate. Theoretical concepts like secularization, disenchantment, and the rise of capitalism were all products of this second intellectual practice. In the next century and beyond, social scientific inquiry expanded exponentially across the globe incorporating historical knowledge about cultures, societies, states, and institutions outside Western Europe.

A central shortcoming of this process of the cognitive expansion of social science was the asymmetry of the two levels. While empirical historical research became increasingly expansive, the corpus of theoretical concepts remained restricted to the original cluster devised mainly in the classical phase of theoretical development. Social science thinking developed a strange “triangular” structure. The theoretical constructs used were invariably drawn from European theoretical models of development of capitalism, the modern state, secularization, and urbanism. Instead of looking for new constructs of theory, rich empirical material and historical evidence were sought to be forced into the theoretical constructs drawn from early modern social theory. This theoretical problem works sometimes at an even deeper level, as empirical descriptions of social reality cannot use a theory-independent language; and the obligatory use of the conventional language obstructs a clearer apprehension of reality or obfuscates understandings of real patterns in historical events. Studies in our collection illustrate the necessity of greater awareness of these questions for social theory. In this section, we examine the conceptual foundations that initiated the collaborative project: the internal heterogeneity of democracy; pluralism; and identity; and a particular consequence of their mixture, “majorities” and “minorities.”

An interesting feature of scholarly literature on democracy is that democracy itself is rarely historicized. The standard procedure for the analysis of democracy and its historical tribulations is to focus on a constitution that is viewed as democratic and to record occasional decline and the rise of authoritarian rule in its

place. However, a closer reading of the internal records of all democratic societies should promote a more intrinsically historical approach to the existence of democracy itself. Society does not become uniformly democratic for all its citizens simply by the adoption of a universal franchise or competitive elections, even on a procedural account. It is a historical fact that legal frames engage citizens in self-rule and protect groups from arbitrary power to quite different degrees. Democracy is an internally uneven system in practically all its real incarnations. Democracy—if it indicates a political experience of procedural equality, the secure enjoyment of rights, and protection from avoidable, arbitrary power—is internally heterogeneous in all instances across various criteria—in terms of class, caste, region, and historical period. Democracy in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s incorporated the government of Northern Ireland, where Catholics suffered forms of legalized exclusion. That Black Americans in the United States were widely disenfranchised, could not enter restaurants, or ride in front seats of buses in the postwar decades did not lead political scientists to declare America a non-democratic polity. Northern Ireland—like Kashmir in South Asia—is an example of regional unevenness in the enjoyment of democratic rights. The treatment of African Americans—like Dalits in India or Ahmadis in Pakistan—is illustrative of the domination of persons along the lines of race, caste, and religion. The case of Dalits in India reveals further that even when there is legal equality, the practical enjoyment of democratic rights can be uneven. Similarly, for Alevi and Kurds in Turkey, democratic rights are unevenly distributed and enjoyed. While some scholars, especially in comparative politics, view the process of democratization to be complete upon the institution of competitive elections, we posit that it continues as a process thereafter as well.

The institutional requirement in a democratic constitution of abstractly equal rights can work against domination. Excluded groups can use the declared principles of democratic constitutions to protest against domination, often allowing them to achieve actual improvement in their political condition. Democracy remains an ideal: a political system can slide toward lesser or greater enjoyment of actual democratic rights by ordinary people across a scale. A realistic picture of democracy can only arise if this internal unevenness and heterogeneity is acknowledged and recorded in our political analyses. This collection tries to understand how the internal heterogeneity of democracy affects the prospects of pluralism and vice versa in Pakistan, India, and Turkey.

Pluralism, the other central concept of this volume, also requires definition. Pluralism does not inevitably follow from plurality. Sudipta Kaviraj (in his chapter) defines religious plurality as “the brute fact of existing differences between religious groups,” whereas religious pluralism refers to a “cognitive and ethical attitude . . . allowing all faith-groups to practice their religious life without hindrance from other faiths or from the state.” Where diversity and difference

are endemic, pluralism, as a politically accommodative recognition of difference, can reduce the possibility of domination.

The term “identity” itself—which plays such an essential role in all our chapters—requires a clearer and more refined definition. In our analysis, the idea of identity always has at least two meanings: the identity of the *individual*, and the identity of the *collectivity*. Under modern conditions, identity becomes vital in both senses, because modernity transforms both types of identity and gives them a new intensity. Modern individuals are incited to choose their identities by the constant interpellation of intellectual forces and modern institutions, acting most powerfully through their peers. Even if individualism is not widely embraced as a moral-philosophical ideal, waves of influence of liberalism, socialism, and other modernist political ideologies usually encourage a strong emphasis on the individual’s selection of positions. Yet many of these modern ideologies urge modern assertive individuals to view themselves as members of a large, agentive collective identity—like the nation, or the people, or the religious community, or regional culture. Political modernity might contribute to the intensification of both senses of community—individual and collective. This is particularly true because in many cases, the politically assertive individual chooses a collective identity—like the nation, people, or religious community—to mark herself. Identification with a larger collective identity—which a person considers imperiled, or from which a person draws sustenance—is often folded into the making of individual identity itself.

A persistent difficulty with identity is that self-identification is usually inextricably linked to other-identification as well. The self—especially collective ones—tends to be identified by attributes that are marked off against others. In this sense, identities are relational. Consider the demands to define “Muslim” in a restrictive fashion in Pakistan, which pushed Ahmadis outside its boundaries. The Ahmadis—when they defined themselves—did not see the boundaries falling that way. But modern identities are ordinarily political—in the sense that our identity is constituted by what we think we are, but also by what others think we are. Moreover, since their thinking is reflected in their *acting* toward us in a particular way, it forces us to take that view of ourselves into account, and act back toward it. Conceptions of identities are, in this sense, generally agentive. The complex interactions between different religious communities—through their self-definition and other-definition—chronicled in the studies included in this volume raise the question of reviewing the conceptual grids that social scientists employ.

When situated in the discourse of modern government, the distinction between majorities and minorities emerges as a prism for understanding political conflict. Varying ideas of popular sovereignty and nationalism encourage the belief that the state “belongs” to its people. If the people have internal divisions,

there is a drift toward the idea that the “majority” has a prior claim. Remarkably, this is a quintessentially modern claim made on the state; premodern states did not have to contend with an equivalent political-moral notion for two reasons. First, as boundaries of empires tended to fluctuate constantly, it was difficult to set up a relation of this kind between the state and its people, besides the fact of the concentration of sacralized authority in a single person. Second, premodern states often worked based on various levels of allocation of political authority that were subordinate to the higher level, but which also had substantial power—an arrangement of political power quite different from modern notions of sovereignty. Although the terms “sovereign” and “sovereignty” were used widely to refer to the highest imperial authorities and the ultimacy of their power, neither word carried the legal connotation of modern sovereignty.

There are two different uses of the language of majority and minority that need to be differentiated. In the idealized account of democratic theory, legitimate decisions have to be taken by the majority principle. Majorities are abstract collectives created in the moment of a political decision constituted by the aggregation of individual wills. They are episodic and random in the sense that an individual falling into a majority in case of a vote on one issue can be in the minority on another. Being part of a decisional minority does not give rise to resentment against being outside of the decision-making process altogether. This is different from when the language of majority/minority tracks identity divisions, which are stickier. Falling into a minority as an identity category can mean systematic exclusion from citizenship status and from major decisional processes of a society. In such cases, the possibility of being in the decisional majority is significantly lower. However, as we saw earlier, even such designations of majority/minority status depend crucially on the way a state and its people, or its “nation,” are defined. With an internally pluralistic definition of Islam, sects like the Ahmadiyya would be counted as part of the political community. A more restrictive notion would, by contrast, not merely extrude the Ahmadiyya outside the Muslim community, but tend to restrict itself further to exclude groups like the Shia. Comparably, a pluralist notion of the nation in India can view Muslims as equal citizens. In contrast, a restrictive conception of the nation around a Hindu nationalist self-conception would tend to reduce them to a condition of domination before turning on itself and narrowing the definition of Hindus. Once the identitarian language of majority/minority enters the political life of a society, its effects have proved irreversible.

In Pakistan, India, and Turkey, majority and minority communities are constituted by inheritances of imperial pasts that, while subjugating these groups, created some frameworks for the management and regulation of difference. In Turkey, republican leaders sought a rupture from the Ottoman Empire across domains, including an inversion of a spirit of toleration into a secularized state

based upon the primacy of ethnically Turkish Sunni Muslims. India's elites committed themselves to institutionalized pluralism in a negotiated settlement that balanced the imperatives of modern, individuated, liberal democracy and long-standing religious traditions and caste inequities. Pakistan's elite settlement was less definitive and more protracted. The result, however, was an explicit endorsement of an Islamic state and the institutionalized domination of Bengalis, and Ahmadis and other minorities. The contemporary trajectories of all three cases highlight deepening domination and perilously poised democratization. In Turkey, "political Islam" under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has encouraged greater religiosity among Sunni, and thereby, displaced the prevailing republican secularism. While India's constitutionally entrenched principles of equality and secularism always remained somewhat aspirational, the rise of Hindu nationalism threatens even its symbolic dominance. Pakistan's nascent democratization has had little observable effect on minority domination, and the future of democracy and of pluralism there remains uncertain.

I.3 Histories

I.3.1. The Transition in Turkey

Turkey's transition from empire to nation-state marks a transformation from imperial to national rule, with particular implications for religious and other forms of diversity. The Young Turks tried initially to save the empire and, after failing to do so, to build a new entity. The Ottoman Empire was a multireligious and multiethnic imperial society with a long tradition of state-managed diversity. In the transition, non-Muslim communities moved from being autonomous, tolerated, and protected "millets" to equal citizens exposed to the vagaries of transitional violence. From the empire's violent dissolution emerged a Turkey that was somewhat easily demarcated and territorially sound.

Ottoman society might be one of the better cases of imperial accommodation of religion with a state carefully attending to religious differences and defining the role religion played in the imperial polity (Barkey 2008). Starting in the late thirteenth century, the Ottomans conceived a polity that was open to diversity. This accommodation was largely due to the particular regional and demographic conditions of conquest, the Turkic experience in the steppes of Central Asia and in the Seljuk empire that had preceded the Ottomans. Mixing this experience with a particular understanding of Islam that guided Muslim rulers to accept Christians and Jews as People of the Book, they established a tolerant imperial society that refrained from large-scale persecution of diversity. This difference, which Ottomans realized had *to be managed rather than eliminated*, became one

of the most important aspects of the relationship between state and religious communities. Mostly, the imperial recognition of the value of diversity trumped the possibility of religious exclusion, especially as the Ottoman state remained vigilant about its control over religious extremes. The tightly supervised supremacy of the state over the predominant religion also helped contain the deleterious effects of Islamic orthodoxy. Despite such imperial jurisdiction, the forces that controlled religion also contributed to its entrenchment. The ulema built tremendous institutional competence and continuity through Ottoman history, most clearly visible at critical moments of the transition from empire to nation-state and thereafter. That is to say, the institutional representatives of an Orthodox version of Islam remained steadfast in their preferences on societal oversight even as the secular state insisted on “laic secularism.” Such institutional continuity—and complexity—remains part of the contemporary rise of political Islam.

In the Ottoman Empire, ethnic and religious communities had different structural and cultural profiles. After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II established particular compacts with each religious community (millets), marking a relationship of governance through dependency and autonomy. The Ottomans adopted the Greek Orthodox system of centralized, hierarchical governance for all Orthodox Christians. The compact with the Jews established a decentralized organizational framework around multiple lay leaders, and an intermediate form governed Armenians. Imperial rulers reconfigured these relations in the era of reforms between 1839 and 1856. From quasi-contracts renewed time and again, millets became formally structured and bounded entities, simultaneously endowed with equality and freedom. The citizenship law of 1869 declared full equality under the law. However, the language of “millet” was still used, and communities continued to think of themselves as millets. The contradictions were vast, signaling equality and yet assuming difference through formal “millet” boundaries; wanting to construct a loyal citizenry with Ottomanism as a central concept, while tampering with the internal autonomy of communities by introducing new structures of millet governance. Affording non-Muslims equality under Western European pressure also angered Muslim populations, who perceived Jews and Christians as having too many privileges. This became especially challenging as Muslim refugees poured into the shrinking empire.

The reform era mobilized religious communities qua communities and accelerated the process of individual identity formation, which culminated in the post-1908 revolutionary celebrations as well as in the elections that followed. After the unraveling of the revolution and the subsequent counterrevolution, these communities’ “dreams were shattered” to different degrees, as Bedross der Matossian (2014) demonstrates. Through the European powers’ interwar

occupation of the Ottoman territories, each of the millets confronted different challenges. The Armenians, who had experienced pogroms following Russian intervention in eastern provinces, lived through the Ottoman massacres of 1895–96, which escalated into the genocide of 1915. Greeks faced various iterations of war and the flight of western Anatolian populations for Greece that culminated in the formal population exchanges of 1923. Jews, among the least politicized by the transformations, suffered the consequences of rising anti-millet sentiment through the wars. As the Balkans fell apart despite the zealous Young Turks' increasingly desperate and violent attempts to save the empire, the millets lost their privileges and autonomy and faced imminent extermination and expulsion. Those who escaped that fate became minorities.

In the denouement of this transition from empire to the nation-state, millets became minorities, a new vocabulary with negative implications for understandings of belonging in the new polity. The Treaty of Lausanne formally inaugurated the shift from millet to minority in 1923. Turkish nationalists came to view the politics of “minority rights” with contempt partly because the discourse emerged while the empire was being dismembered. They saw it as a concession to contemporary Western discourses on religious freedom and minority rights. The appellation of minority was applied to non-Muslim communities and underscored a potential unwillingness to accept them as part of the Turkish nation (Rodrigue 2013). The ethnic and religious groups within Islam, the Kurds and Alevis respectively, were subjected to forcible assimilation. In other words, non-Muslims, precluded from full belonging, became minorities, while the “Turkish” label veiled difference internal to Islam. The Turkish state did not demand loyalty by conversion (especially since the rhetoric of the state was strictly secular). However, the elite institutionalized distinctions between Muslims/Turks and non-Muslims in everyday life. Campaigns such as “Citizens Speak Turkish!” clearly discriminated against minorities who spoke various languages and were uncomfortable with the new Turkish language. In the absence of the millet's institutionalized protections, minorities felt unmoored. Finally, while the millet was perceived positively in imperial idiom, “minority” was and still is a vilified label.

Most scholars of Turkish secularization accept the conventional description of Turkish secularism: the ruling elite prohibited the public display of Muslim religiosity, while controlling religious life through a dedicated bureaucracy. We suggest that secularization proceeded at two levels, one restricting the formal and informal representations of Islam, the other allowing for continuity in clerical institutions under the aegis of the state. First and foremost, secularization modeled on the French experience affected the public display of religion. In the Anatolian countryside, away from the gaze of the state, conservative Islamic practice endured. The policies of the new republican state most adversely impacted

Sufi orders and heterodox groups on the margins of Ottoman religiosity, most of which were eliminated or went underground.

Second, even though the state strictly controlled it, religion continued to have an institutional existence. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the religious bureaucracy had remained integrated into the state of Abdülhamit but also through the centralization policies of the Young Turks, and in the particular secular politics of Kemalist Turkey. Religious mobilization in the name of Islam was instrumental in rallying troops to fight the War of Independence. With the establishment of the Republic, control over Sunni practice remained with the Directorate of Religious Affairs (an organization similar to the Ottoman Seyh-ül-Islam). Even though the directorate's initial mandate was restricted, its role expanded, especially following the 1980 parchment-barrier constitution, whence it became the institution tasked with promoting Sunni Islamic religiosity. Although laicity eliminated public symbols of religion, Sunni Islam was privileged, and the directorate promoted institutionalized religiosity. Turkish secularism was not position-neutral; it favored Sunni Islam, just as Turkishness privileged ethnic Turks over other ethnic and religious groups.

Unlike the Jewish and Orthodox millets, the Kurdish and Alevi populations identify as Muslim. The new state's Turkification program subjected them to forced assimilation. This entailed the abandonment of the Kurdish language and Alevi religious traditions and disavowing all displays of Kurdish and Alevi cultural difference. The Sunni Muslim masses and their ulema were also disappointed, for they saw their sacrifices for nation-building abandoned in favor of a secular ideal. The new modern, westernized Turkey jettisoned pluralism and rendered both minorities and majorities uneasy, albeit asymmetrically. Today, under the leadership of Erdoğan and the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), nationalism has become entwined with Sunni Islam much more forcefully, with the state backing the rejection of all other forms of Islamic belonging.

In sum, during the transition from empire to national state Turkey refashioned its relations with diversity, turning the three millets into minorities, subduing the Sunni Islamic population's religiosity while defining the nation through their identity, and repressing Muslim others into submission. Even though non-Muslim minorities have been affected by this transformation, their numerical insignificance (Jews, Armenians, and Greeks comprise less than 1 percent of the population) has mitigated their fate. They have remained on the margins of political life. Kurds and Alevis, however, have organized at different historical moments, with varying success. The significant institutional continuity bolstered the ascendancy and dominance of Sunni Muslims that their faith enjoyed, while observers mistakenly fixated on the formal and informal structures of secularism.

I.3.2. Unmaking British India

In the subcontinent, too, the arrival of political modernity spelt a profound transformation of state institutions and the historical transference from an empire-state to something like a nation-state. However, the imagination of the “nation-state” was both complex and fragmented. Unlike Turkey, the territorial space now called India was rarely securely unified under a single political regime, except short periods when a great line of empires—the Mauryas (first century BC), the Guptas (fourth century AD), the Delhi Sultanate (twelfth–sixteenth centuries AD) and the Mughal Empire (sixteenth–eighteenth centuries AD)—touched the highest point of their expansion. Even during these interregnums, the territorial expanse contained a variety of kingdoms and political authorities and different models of rulership. However, social history shows the existence of several large religious communities from ancient times. Political rulers were faced from the time of the Mauryas with a choice between aligning the state exclusively with a single religious group, and subordinating or extruding the others, or following a policy of accommodation toward a diversity of religious communities. At least since the time of Asoka, the general response of imperial rulers to religious diversity or plurality was accommodation in some form rather than exclusion. Mughal rulers followed this pragmatic tradition. Although they were formally adherents of Sunni Islam, they maintained close ties with the neighboring Persian empire and fostered the practice of Shia Islam among their subjects. More significantly, the dominant sections of their subject population consisted of Hindu sects. Despite evidence of sporadic incidents of temple destruction, the Mughals pursued a policy of accommodation toward differing strands of Islamic and Hindu sects. If we use the conceptual distinction between plurality—the brute fact of diversity of faiths—and pluralism—an ethical acknowledgment of the value of differing religious paths, and in some cases, even a celebration of the ethical, philosophical, cultural multiplicity this produced—the Mughal state was certainly animated by a *pluralist* political and cultural principle. Besides this political doctrine, religious life in everyday practice was dominated on the Islamic side by Sufi doctrines, on the Hindu side by followers of bhakti saints—like Vaishnavas, and by nascent syncretic traditions like those of the Sikhs. These sects followed a principle of mutual everyday toleration, giving rise to syncretic devotion at the popular level, and in some cases to innovative forms that combined and transcended the two primary faiths.

The initial stages of British expansion in India were accompanied by the arrival of Protestant missionaries who saw an immense opportunity for proselytization assisted by a Christian colonial power. However, pragmatic considerations of colonization and imperial expansion soon dispelled such trends. The colonial administration mostly refused the missionary temptation of expanding

a spiritual empire of Christianity and discouraged the use of official patronage for Christians. The British colonial state, especially after the rebellion of 1857–58, positioned itself as a neutral arbiter between contending religious communities and their occasionally conflicting demands. Colonial scholarship, policy, and overt propaganda increasingly represented the historical relationship between Hindus and Muslims as one of eternal conflict. After James Mill's highly influential work on the history of the empire, the colonial knowledge complex portrayed Muslim rule as an earlier form of colonization. The specter of conflict between communities, primarily Hindus and Muslims, became a perpetual anxiety through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Simultaneously, technologies of rule, like the census, allowed states to acquire information, and thereby to manage communities. The census became a project of enumeration that produced these communities—Hindu, Muslim, scheduled castes, and so on—across the territorial expanse of British India. Late colonial policies like the introduction of separate electorates in limited representative institutions fixed and facilitated aggregated religious-political communities. Nevertheless, there was a long historical lineage behind the idea that the state should not become affiliated with a single religious community, and the British frequently appealed to their distance from both communities to legitimate their arbitration.

In British India too, not surprisingly, something akin to the contrast between millets and minorities was played out in political discourse. As the idea of the modern state with representative institutions became familiar in Indian political discourses, some Muslim thinkers, often based in Muslim-minority provinces, expressed anxiety about the future status of Muslims if the British Empire ended. The prospect of turning from an aristocratic minority into a minority under representative institutions was viewed with grave misgiving by a long line of Muslim leaders. Political debates before Indian independence consequently turned on the crucial question of representation of majorities and minorities in a modern “nation-state.” Muslim political thought gradually divided into two traditions.

Leaders in the Muslim League eventually accepted the “two-nation theory,” which claimed that the two religious communities were so fundamentally different that they could not coexist in a common “nation-state.” But another section of the Muslim leadership agreed with leaders of the Indian National Congress in conceiving of its nation pluralistically, according minorities special protection in the constitution. The irreconcilable divergence between these two conceptions of the state led to the partition of British India and the death and displacement of millions. The state that the Indian constitution designed, and called by the name “nation-state,” was a substantially different imaginative construct from the standard version of the European nation-state. The Congress elites sought to avoid forming a “nation” around a single group of people that would reduce others to unequal partners in the political community with long-standing

relations of antagonism and domination. After independence, in India, this non-homogeneous, pluralist conception of the people and its state remained the dominant political discourse. It seemed that the ideal of a religious-pluralist “secular” political order had triumphed; providing a secular basis to India’s democracy—although its image of secularity was vastly different from the French ideal of *laïcité*.

The events leading to the partition of British India, however, revealed that the existence of a plurality of religious groups as brute fact did not necessarily lead to the growth of pluralist philosophical or political traditions. Precisely this common past was read in radically opposed ways between two influential sets of political elites. India and Pakistan had a shared history—but this was interpreted by their politically dominant elites in entirely opposite ways. If the Nehruvian leadership in the Congress sought to build its constitutional design on the pluralist interpretation of the historical past, Pakistan under Jinnah was predicated on an opposite reading of this identical history. The independence of India was, from this angle, a profoundly ambiguous event: the creation of two states legitimizing two different readings of a shared past. India’s political trajectory after independence showed internal complexities. Even though Nehru came to office, many in his party retained proclivities for domination over minorities. Hindu nationalist political parties suffered a temporary defeat, but remained a strident presence in political life. On a subtler level, Hindu nationalism as a political sentiment persisted in varying degrees among members of quite different political groups. For instance, segments of the Congress, and even some sections of the socialist political groups, expressed milder and fragmentary forms of Hindu nationalist sentiment. Yet there is a significant paradox in Indian democratic politics that demands some explanation. An array of factors, including the enumerative logic of democratic competition, led to a re-emergence of Hindu nationalist politics from the 1980s. After a period in which successive Hindu nationalist and pluralist coalition governments ruled at the center, in the 2014 general elections, Hindu nationalists came to office with a simple majority. Thereafter, democracy has been beset by majoritarian domination rather than straightforward authoritarianism or populism.

The Muslim League, led by Jinnah, was successful in establishing a separate state for Muslims in the subcontinent. Pakistan’s founding, unlike India and Turkey, was not marked by a definitive elite settlement. We cannot say with certainty whether the legacy of Pakistan’s founding moment was Jinnah’s oft-quoted vision of religious freedom for minorities within a state created for South Asian Muslims or an Islamic republic ruled according to Maududi’s ordering of divine and democratic sovereignty. By 1970, few dominant voices remained to defend the more “secular” conception of the state. The constitutional process of negotiating between these visions, staged in Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly,

failed in 1954, and Pakistan's establishment as an Islamic state in 1956 was soon followed by military rule. The creation of Bangladesh in 1971 shattered the rhetoric of a nation for all South Asian Muslims. In its aftermath, through periods of democratic rule and military government, systemic violence and exclusion against religious minorities have intensified. The legacy of General Zia ul-Haque's derided "Islamization" has scarcely eroded. Elected governments following Zia's demise have actively sought to restore civilian power. However, civilian Prime Ministers, and Musharraf's military regime alike have not reversed state-sponsored Sunni domination.

Imran Khan's Pakistani Tehreek-i-Insaf Party's victory in 2018 heralds an unpredictable future for Pakistan's democratic future. It is also unclear whether democracy in Pakistan will mean religious domination, especially when violence and exclusion elicit wide popular support. One disheartening feature of the functioning of democratic institutions is the stark demonstration of the helplessness of democracy against itself. There are few barriers in the path of politicians who enjoy the support of a majority and seek to undermine democratic institutions.

I.4 Historical Perspectives

In this section, we compare aspects of the Ottoman and British Empires, and the modern states that emerged as their successors. Sadia Saeed's chapter foregrounds this comparative disposition. Saeed presents an intertemporal comparison of Safavid Iran and Mughal India, and contemporary Iran and Pakistan. Discussions on the relation between religion and sociological plurality are sometimes conducted in a rather one-sided manner: the central question is whether religious doctrines acknowledge the socially existing diversity, and make an effort to treat adherents of other religious faiths with dignity. This is a question about the doctrines internal to religious thought. But for premodern societies, which are often deeply religious, an argument about toleration and accommodation of religious diversity might come from an entirely different source—the *political* logic of imperial state formations. Imperial states have fluctuating boundaries, and when states expand very rapidly across territory, they acquire political control over increasingly diverse populations. An argument for toleration or accommodation arises at times from a purely political requirement of imperial states. Since converting these new subjects, or removing them through expulsion or extermination, is not a practically feasible option, imperial ruling elites sometimes craft political arguments for toleration. This can happen despite the existence of anti-pluralist ideas in religious doctrines.

Saeed challenges the notion that Islamic regimes' uniformly violate "minority rights" and that they have done so by following sharia. She argues that

civilizational accounts of Islam's management of heterodoxy select particular features amenable to comparison with Western modernity and sometimes reductively posit sharia as the central principle of premodern Islamic societies. Whereas the Safavid rulers under Shah Abbas and thereafter persecuted and expelled the Nuqtavis, the Mughals, especially under Akbar, consciously promoted accommodation and toleration. Saeed shows that sharia, as a vocabulary of law and legitimacy, was not the primary motivation in either regime's disposition toward minorities. Contemporary Iran and Pakistan are more similar than their imperial precursors—both regimes persecute religious heterodoxies like the Baha'i and the Ahmadis. However, Saeed suggests that sharia could also legitimate opposition to Ahmadi exclusion, thereby demonstrating the versatility of Islamic religious vocabularies and emphasizing that political decisions do not follow inevitably from religious texts.

Both the Ottoman and the Mughal Empires acknowledged the presence of diversity, even though sociologically, the two empires were very different. In Turkey, other religious communities—the Christians and the Jews—were smaller groups living under the rule of a state that presided over a predominantly Muslim population. In India, this relation was reversed: even at its apogee, the Mughal Empire's subjects were mostly Hindus. However, Hindus rarely identified themselves as a single faith until the nineteenth century, in contrast to Jews and Christians. Unlike in Turkey, the presence of Islam in South Asia was socially dispersed, similar to the social organization of the Hindus, not organized by a state-recognized religious bureaucracy.

Over centuries, the bare political compulsion of tolerance became an institutionalized ethic of toleration and political pluralism. The Ottomans allocated specific privileges to the non-Muslims in the primarily Muslim center of the empire. In its external dominions, the empire had to administer areas that were primarily inhabited by non-Muslim subjects. The empire-state under the Mughals had to follow policies that reckoned with the established condition that Hindus vastly outnumbered their Muslim subjects. In the world outside the modern West, such practices of religious pluralism were intellectually established and turned into state policies much earlier than the rise of modern political toleration in Western political theory. However, both the fundamental principles of such accommodative politics and its institutional form were quite different, understandably, from Western secularism. When democratic forms of government were established in these societies, they had a long historical lineage of indigenous political theory and practice upon which they could draw.¹

¹ It is not our suggestion that these legacies were symmetric. Both empires had significant fluctuations in imperial policy over time, and the Mughal Empire's effective sovereignty over large parts of India had begun to collapse as early as 1712. British rule interrupted this legacy and radically

The various inherited “usable pasts” were treated differently by the political elites in India, Pakistan, and Turkey. Our contributors examine the array of intellectual currents that circulated for approval in the twilight of empire. Two dissimilarities between the three cases are strikingly evident. First, as the Ottoman Empire shrank disastrously after the First World War, Turkey became more religiously and ethnically homogeneous. Turkish elites opted to obstruct the public display of Muslim religiosity while regulating religious life, notably through its ecclesiastical bureaucracy. Simultaneously, they endorsed symbolic primacy for ethnically Turk and religiously Sunni Muslim identity. In modern Turkey, continuity with the older forms of pluralism nearly disappeared, while the legacy of state-controlled Islam continued. Christine Philliou’s chapter chronicles the decline of a counterfactual possibility. She demonstrates how the liberal, pluralist elite who had backed the Tanzimat reforms were steadily sidelined from politics as the Young Turk faction gained prominence and established a nationalist, authoritarian agenda to salvage the empire. The reformist liberal elites saw the future of the empire as a renewed imperial formation shaped by the confessional and ethnic pluralism that had been the backbone of imperial strength. Even though they represented another path to modernity and nationhood, they lacked ties to the crucial institutions and were overcome by nationalist forces. Their defeat led to the discursive superimposition of treason and liberalism. Liberal reformists were persecuted, and with their defeat, the Young Turks tied liberalism and toleration to treachery and betrayal of the nation. Their defeat narrowed the trajectory of the transition, and notwithstanding ebbs and flows in the practice of democracy, liberalism has not resurfaced in Turkey’s political mainstream.

Meanwhile, the last decades of British rule in undivided India saw fervent intellectual activity undergirding movements for independence, religious reform, and the overthrow of the caste system. Faisal Devji’s chapter recounts influential theorists’ attempts to subvert colonial assumptions about the banality of religious conflict and the bankruptcy of South Asian political thought. The figures Devji discusses, exemplars of Hindu, Muslim, and Dalit politics, engage in a project that clarifies the problem of *rational* interest in colonial religious and caste politics. They reject the colonial framing of impassioned, irrational natives destined for perpetual bloodshed and consider anew the causes of and motivations for communal conflict, and what to do about it. For B. R. Ambedkar, contestation over rational interests was impeded by collective mobilization at the expense of individual rationality among Hindus and Muslims, and, more significantly, by the perversity of caste, which misrepresented the interests of upper castes

altered language and idiom in public life. It is an open question whether political elites were inspired by more than a distant historical memory of negotiated toleration.

as those of all Hindus. Reformulating religious mobilization was a priority for Muslim separatists and Hindu nationalists alike. M. A. Jinnah and V. D. Savarkar understood extant religious conflict as born from the history of intimate relations, and both sought to *rationalize* the basis of their community's engagement with the other and within itself. Whereas Jinnah sought to create a mutual interest in harmony, Savarkar sought to produce for the Hindu community a more instrumentally rational political lexicon. M. K. Gandhi stood apart in rejecting rationality, and interest, especially of property, as the basis of harmonious cooperation. Mohammad Iqbal was also suspicious of the notion that a society based on interest was desirable. But he prescribed a spiritual solution steeped in the unique intellectual traditions of South Asian Islam, quite distinct from Gandhi's emphasis on everyday sacrifice and self-abnegation.

Uday Mehta's chapter presents an examination of Gandhi's critique of the dominant approaches to religious diversity, including that of postcolonial India's constitution. Mehta suggests that Gandhi rejected fundamental assumptions about religious conflict, such as its inevitable escalation, and instead saw it as self-regulating and contained. Gandhi opposed understanding and articulating religious diversity and conflict in modern political terms because these traditions had unexceptional, long-standing histories in South Asia. In contrast with a securitized vision in which the state resolved such conflicts, Gandhi ardently opposed the idea of an intermediary authority. Secularism, on this account, was a form of mediation between abstract claims and values, not a practical enterprise grounded in everyday life. Moreover, Mehta suggests, it was part and parcel of a project of radical social transformation that Gandhi had little interest in pursuing. Gandhi's solution lay instead in an invocation of religion, which alone could inspire *patience* and thus, coexistence. Mehta's chapter is both a critique of the project of negotiation between state and religion and an invitation to consider religion anew, devoid of the pernicious logics produced within it by statist discourses.

Humeira Iqtidar's chapter examines the thought of Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and Abul A'la Maududi, whose followers claim them as the originators of Hindu nationalism and Islamism, respectively. Unlike Gandhi, Savarkar and Maududi articulated a "modernist conception of religiosity," thereby contributing to a "secularization" of multifarious practice-oriented faiths. Savarkar's *The Essentials of Hindutva* is steeped in a nationalist vocabulary drawn from his interpretation of European nationalism. Savarkar's priority was the construction of an inclusive, territorially linked nation with hierarchical claims based on greater attachment—that of coinciding ancestral and religious allegiance to India, which would never be available to Muslims and Christians. Maududi, on the other hand, critiqued the uncritical imitation of European nationalism, which was incompatible with Islam and contained the possibility of unbridled

racial domination. Maududi suggested that the extent of religious plurality in British India necessitated political nationality—a framework for the negotiation of political differences—rather than cultural nationalism, based on the homogeneity of social conditions. However, both assumed and accepted what they took to be democracy’s central imperative: constituting and sustaining a “majority.” For Savarkar, this majority was a Hindu majority, defined by the coincidence of holy and ancestral territory. For Maududi, the majority included the Muslims of the world, motivated to support democracy for the furtherance of ethical principles compatible with Allah’s sovereign will. Democracy itself would not have a settled relationship with pluralism, and the projects that claim inspiration from Savarkar and Maududi would benefit from a reliance upon majority will in democratic and military rule alike.

Pakistan’s 1956 constitution declared it an Islamic state and equipped it with an institutional apparatus to ensure adherence to certain religious precepts. The Pakistani elite permitted only the public religiosity of Sunni Islam even as the persecution of Ahmadis began before the constitution’s enactment and intensified in the following decades. Even as the Indian and Pakistani trajectories differed, alternative “usable pasts” remain alive within their traditions as, for instance, Savarkar’s imaginary of a Hindu nationalist India finds resurgence under the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

In political life, all moments or all periods are not equal. There can be two different spans of equal time—let us say a decade—that are of quite unequal historical importance. Founding moments might determine the future course of history, precisely because these are moments in which framing institutions are often shaped: a constitution formed, or state boundaries established. These events are themselves products of contingent moments, but they serve to constrain the range of options available to later generations of political actors. In this respect, the founding moments in India, Pakistan, and Turkey are interesting to compare, especially because unprecedented mass violence accompanied each transition.

For Turkey, the postwar years saw the vast Ottoman Empire shrink into a state that was territorially much smaller. Because a large inward migration of populations accompanied the collapse of the empire, the residual state was more homogeneous in terms of religion and ethnicity. The Armenian genocide and forced exchanges were absorbed as necessities and their genocidal impact denied in official histories. Independence for India was a profoundly ambiguous event: the celebration of freedom was inextricable from the political failure to prevent a territorial partition of British India into two separate, eventually hostile states, and more significantly, from the massacre of millions of people caught in the transfer of populations. The Indian political elite sought to fashion a constitution that could render such events less probable in future.

Through a negotiated process, they established universal franchise democracy and enshrined minority protections in the constitution. Although the actual enjoyment of minority rights was sometimes constrained in political life, these were protected in cultural and educational life. The same event—partition—was a moment of triumph in Pakistan, the culmination of a successful movement for a state for South Asian Muslims. In this sense, it acted not to constrain elites, but to empower claims for a state that gave symbolic primacy to Islam. Partition's material effects—relatively disadvantageous for Pakistan in economic and military resources—only exacerbated the challenges to democratic compromise.

The second axis of comparison concerns the career of democracy in each society. Turkey's modern transformation has often been overtly authoritarian, with long spells of military government and formal one-party rule. Republican elites, parties, and the military, as the guardians of secularism and claimants to Atatürk's legacy, colluded to keep power in their hands to the detriment of the Anatolian hinterland. This latter group, more conservative and overtly religious, over time became increasingly dissatisfied with the ruling parties. The dissatisfaction of religious Muslims mapped onto an anti-authoritarian impulse—from which the AKP benefited in the initial stages of its ascendance. In Pakistan too, democratic competition was frequently interrupted by long spells of military rule. Among the four coup spells, Zia ul-Haq's regime from 1977 through 1988 has perhaps had the most significant impact upon politics thereafter. Religious domination—through coerced public religiosity of the majority and violence against the minorities—intensified, and political competition became subservient to military-determined national security concerns. India's competitive democratic system was formally interrupted only briefly, by the Congress, in the "Emergency" from 1975 to 1977. Most of the constitutional changes initiated during the Emergency were reversed upon the resumption of democratic rule, but the first non-Congress government retained the commitment to a "secular" republic. In the following decade, political parties across the spectrum began making majoritarian appeals and promoting violence—especially against Sikhs and Muslims—rendering the "secular" label aspirational rather than achieved.

Our historical comparison alludes to different explanatory challenges in each case, based upon our shared anxiety about the relationship between democracy and religious pluralism since the modern foundation of these polities.

I.5 Genealogies of State and Religion

Many of our chapters deal with the founding moments of these polities—Turkey's foundation through the Kemalist constitution, India's Constituent Assembly and interim government, and Pakistan's more indecisive and protracted process of

settling down into an institutional system determined by its constitution. In these cases, and elsewhere in the non-European world, this constituted a period of transition in a peculiar sense. Most non-European states were some form of empire-states or their successors, which may not have inherited their vast territorial extent but continued with the features of their political institutions. For instance, the empire-states did not demand too close a connection between the rulers and their subjects, notions of popular sovereignty, or European-style “nationalism.” Thus, what the process of transition was from was quite clear: it was a breakdown of imperial systems and replacement of empire-states by states of some different form. What would emerge from the transition was much less clear for two reasons. First, the conversion into another form of state took decades, even centuries, and was not evident, in the sense of being uncompleted for some time; and second, the transition was not to a single form of the state. Indeed, what the form was to be was both contested and multiple.

We need to observe an interesting feature of these foundations: these are all equally foundational moments in the life of their states, but they are not foundations of the same thing. If we set aside the misleading idea from international law that “all states are nation-states” or that “we live in a time of nation-states,” we shall realize an important truth about the international state order—that the nation is not primarily a legal category: it is a sociological category to which the international order gives a uniform, legal recognition a posteriori. The nation-state, to be meaningful, must be a kind of state. Historically, the term emerged as a new kind of state emerged in Europe out of the slow decline and fragmentation of imperial states—the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire, the Spanish and Portuguese empires, and the imperial structures of the French state. Imperial states had constantly fluctuating boundaries, and therefore the relation between their structures and their populations were not stable. As a further consequence, these states were far more accustomed to dealing with and acknowledging diversity among their subjects. The states that emerged after the disruption of the imperial orders were far more homogeneous, with fixed boundaries and fixed populations, which were systematically homogenized by orderly ethnic cleansing now described as the Westphalian process. This form came to be defined as the nation-state.

The states that emerged from the foundational moments of the non-Western world were quite heterogeneous. In our three cases, the state outcomes were quite divergent. Turkey decided in favor of the typical European state, specifically a French model—secular, ethnically homogeneous (or pretending to be), and based on a uniform national citizenry. Pakistan, at least formally, also adopted the European model of a sociologically singular nation of citizens—stressing their identity of the Muslim religion, and ignoring other, especially linguistic, forms of diversity. India, by contrast, adopted through its constitution a

model of a state based explicitly on a diverse group of peoples—separated by religion, caste, language, regional culture, and so forth—an internally plural political community. Yet these were all called by the international community equally “nation-states”; and more confusingly, they themselves applied that descriptive term to themselves. Pakistan and Turkey conceived themselves as nation-states, as did India—though far more implausibly. In our historical analysis, therefore, we have to be skeptical about this false and entirely misleading homogenization and pursue the logic of very different kinds of state-making in each case.

In her contribution to this volume, Rochana Bajpai examines how the Indian state has negotiated between the claims of different religious groups and the effects of state policies on societal pluralism. A state’s approach to religious plurality is itself plural at any given time and over time. Bajpai’s typology of political pluralism unsettles the narrative of the state as an unchanging agent of homogenization over time. Precolonial regimes adopted “hierarchical pluralism,” where the dominance of one religion was recognized, while others were tolerated within an asymmetric hierarchy produced by caste. Thereafter, following British rule, the Indian constitution heralded four forms of negotiation: weak multicultural, integrationist exclusionary, integrationist inclusionary, and strong multicultural. Weak multiculturalism describes limited self-regulation for minorities, with the acknowledgment that the state’s prerogatives are prior, as in the case of the constitution’s recognition of group rights and autonomy for minorities in the practice and propagation of religion and in cultural and educational affairs. Strong multiculturalism refers to internal regulation valued for itself, as in the Congress’s problematic support for the Muslim orthodoxy in the Shah Bano case. Integrationist exclusionary measures included the disestablishment of separate electorates and the refusal to reserve constituencies for religious minorities in their stead. Scheduled castes and tribes were treated somewhat more inclusively, with reserved constituencies defended as serving integrative as well as social justice goals simultaneously. Bajpai argues that majoritarian assimilationism, with similarities to Sri Lanka and Pakistan, has supplanted these approaches to diversity under Hindu nationalist rule in India. Unlike integrationism, assimilationism denies the legitimacy of pluralism and seeks to impose majority practices, symbols, and control on minorities.

Ateş Altınordu introduces a different logic of state-religion engagement in his examination of the prospects of postsecularism in contemporary Turkey. Postsecularism, in Jürgen Habermas’s formulation, describes a new phase in the relationship between state and religion, wherein secular and religious actors develop the capacity for mutual respect and complementary learning. Altınordu’s empirical analysis focuses on compulsory religious instruction in primary and secondary schools, the status of public atheism, and complementary learning processes between religious and secular citizens during the Gezi protests of 2013.

He shows that far from being able to develop complementary learning processes that lead to mutual respect, neither religious nor secular actors have been able to become respectful of the other, partly due to political polarization. Altınordu concludes by suggesting that Habermas was insufficiently attentive to the state's power over discourse, and the possibility that this power might be actively exercised to prevent the advent of postsecularism.

Matthew Nelson highlights the plurality of approaches to pluralism by examining the puzzle of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan's adoption, retention, and reinterpretation of religious rights articles from Irish and Indian antecedents to explain how a constitutional clause can have varied effects in different contexts. The importation of constitutional text becomes a lens through which Nelson explains changing motivations, and as a result, consequences for religious pluralism. He argues that borrowed constitutional provisions are merely "empty signifiers" that acquire new meanings when read in conjunction with contextual legal and political changes. Religious freedom rights that protected minorities in India and Ireland later specified and legitimated Ahmadi persecution as a non-Muslim minority in Pakistan. Nelson's chapter shows how locating Zia ul-Haq's dictatorship as the beginning of Ahmadi discrimination effectively conceals the complicity of secular parties and politics in creating and sustaining the constitutional architecture that undermined pluralism before and after the lengthy military interlude.

In suggesting that democracy and religious pluralism must be negotiated, we must disambiguate the actors *negotiating* that relationship. Mathew John's chapter traces the Indian Constituent Assembly and, subsequently, the Supreme Court of India's interventions in regulating state interference in religion. John argues that the Supreme Court's use of "essential practices" doctrine has served to constrain the exercise of religious liberty and diminish the extent of religious pluralism. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court has adjudicated which practices are essential to religious worship and which are not, leaving the latter within the domain of legitimate state intervention. Over time, the court has protected a shrinking set of core practices from state intervention. Further, despite its recognition of the plurality of traditions and practices of Hindu religiosity, the Supreme Court has synthesized a doctrinal account of Hindu religion. John argues that an alternative interpretive framework would better protect religious pluralism and empower state intervention in discriminatory practices.

Sudipta Kaviraj's chapter demonstrates the decline of state pluralism, the logic of aggregative identities in political mobilization in independent India, and, in closing, the moral psychology and institutional structure of democratic violence. Kaviraj argues that caste's hierarchical and segmenting features produced a logic of mobilization that, over time, accorded legitimacy to identitarian aggregation of all shades—not just those identified by the constitution-makers as deserving

of recognition on the grounds of social justice. When Dalits, other backward classes (OBCs), and Adivasis created political parties and built extensive social networks, the logic of collective mobilization became a tool for their relative empowerment. However, when these parties struck bargains to acquire political power, they evoked disillusionment among supporters and the ire of upper-caste groups who saw the redistribution of wealth and power as illegitimate. The Congress justified its varied social coalitions with Nehruvian pluralism. Over time, both the party and its purported pluralism were discredited, most successfully and definitively by the BJP in 2014 and 2019. As Savarkar suggested, the composition of Hindus as a political community entailed the thinning of the ethical and practical core of religious practice to erase differences across regions, traditions, and castes. Simultaneously, the definition of Hinduness acquired meaning through differences with Muslims and Christians. Electorally, this identity took shape only over the past three decades, and the BJP's electoral rise and sustenance have come alongside a rise in "everyday violence." Kaviraj explores the conditions of possibility for such violence—the complexity of agential structures in the modern Indian state; the nature of mob violence; and mismatch between a social organization's incentives and a political party's compulsions. The forms and characteristics of violence bring us to the volume's final section.

I.6 Violence and Domination

Conventional accounts of democracy treat the absence of political violence as a necessary condition for democracy to exist. Further, political theorists often imply that democracy prevents political violence between groups competing for power. Following Schumpeter, Western observers of democracy have examined democracy primarily as a *steady-state* framework for political life, rather than a historically unfolding process. In doing so, these thinkers have winnowed numerous forms of political violence to that between elite factions competing for state power. Western theorists presume that political violence, narrowly construed, is kept in abeyance by democracies as found in Western nation-states. Persistent violence against minorities—as in the case of Black Americans—does not affect the prospects of democracy, because it is deemed social and not political. Such a position forecloses careful analyses of the causes and consequences of violence on the institutions of democratic rule. Our contributors thus confront a twofold problem. First, as in the West, the problem of violence has not been settled before the modern state's founding. Second, persistent collective violence against groups has significant consequences for democratic institutions and political activity. The chapters in this volume demonstrate how democratic

logics of mobilization and contestation can cause varied forms of social and political violence imbricating religious communities, practices, and symbols. Reflexively, contributors also describe how acts of violence shape democracy and religious life.

Fatima Bokhari's chapter discusses the transformation of Pakistan's blasphemy laws from legal pluralism provisions that protected group rights into an instrument of domination for the majority community against perceived slights by minorities. She argues that under Zia ul-Haq's rule, the regime amended colonial-era laws regulating speech and offense, formalizing a pattern of discrimination already prevalent in the mobilization against Ahmadis, as discussed in Nelson's chapter. These changes formally restricted the application of blasphemy laws to the protection of Islamic sentiment, as opposed to the sentiment of Pakistan's numerous religious minorities. Bokhari shows how those accused under these laws, their lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and state officials are routinely threatened and have been murdered by those seeking pronouncements of guilt, whether as a judicial verdict or social condemnation. The judicial system in Pakistan does not resolve blasphemy cases; it has instead become a site for the broader political domination of Ahmadis and other minorities.

In India, accusations of cow slaughter, or "love jihad," have acquired a similar status as blasphemy in the popular fury they elicit and the violence that ensues. There is a striking resemblance in the form of violence directed against alleged blasphemers and supposed cow slaughterers. In some cases, groups of men assault and murder victims, often on camera, with the confidence that it was the actions of their peers that resulted in murder. In other cases, they celebrate the victim's death, and proudly proclaim their deed. Social and political organizations provide legitimacy to these actions by commemorating them or even offering them nominations to seek political office. The state and its law enforcement apparatus remain inert, or offer tacit material and symbolic support, signaling that such acts of violence are permissible and possibly desirable.

Amrita Basu chronicles these and other instances of violence in contemporary India. She argues that unlike the BJP-led government of 1998–2004, the second and third BJP-led national governments' tethering of religious nationalism to right-wing populism has led to greater violence against minorities. Selective violence against minorities proliferates below a threshold of casualties that the state has conventionally recorded as mass violence, thereby furthering political polarization without incurring the substantial political costs of a "riot." After 2002, when Narendra Modi's government in Gujarat presided over deadly riots, an earlier model of mobilization by polarization became ineffectual. Pogroms on a large scale seemed to cause unassailable political costs imposed by news media as public opinion, and by associations of industry. Basu extensively chronicles lists "small scale" violence and "hate crimes" against religious, caste, and gender

minorities carried out with the complicity—a priori or belated—and support of the state. These incidents serve both to secure electoral victories and to re-describe the founding narrative of the Indian state.

The fate of ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey has ebbed and flowed through the republican period, with periods of intense violence against Kurdish populations of eastern Turkey, especially under one-party and military rule, and since 2013. The Kurds have been involved in a consistently violent confrontation, fighting against state repression and autonomy. The Alevis have historically been more widely dispersed, and have faced discrimination that bears similarity to the Ahmadiyya in Pakistan. The Diyanet, especially under the AKP regime, classifies the Alevis as Sunni, influenced by Sufism, instead of recognizing their claim to being a non-Sunni Muslim community. The result is that they cannot claim state support for their religious institutions and practices. Unlike recognized minorities, the Alevis are also subjected to compulsory Sunni religious instruction in schools. Jews and Greek Orthodox Christians, insignificant in demographic terms, have a long history of incorporation through indirect rule under the millet system under Ottoman rule, and continue to articulate group claims through community leaders. Violence against minorities in Turkey has taken varied forms, including targeted atrocities, such as the 5–6 September 1955 or the 2 July 1993 attacks against Alevis and a protracted civil war against the Kurdish population. As Turkey attempted to join the European community in the late 1990s, it accepted judicial stipulations from the European Court of Human Rights that portended the possibility of more robust minority protections.

Senem Aslan examines the consequences of this legal shift for state-minority relations in Turkey. She argues that Turkey's courts have developed a statist jurisprudence that continually undermines minority interests and, further, that the judiciary has failed to ensure executive compliance with ECtHR judgments and even Turkish precedents. Aslan illustrates the failure of Alevi judicial activism by considering compulsory religious instruction in schools, religious identification on identity cards, and the construction of cem houses. In each instance, ECtHR jurisprudence was unequivocal in its direction to Turkish authorities, but executive authorities at local and national levels cited domestic law and national courts to disregard, sabotage, or delay implementation. Kurdish legal activism, Aslan suggests, has been comparatively more successful because it was accompanied by widespread social and political mobilization and emerged against the backdrop of a devastating civil war. Activism around the use of Kurdish names and the Kurdish language ultimately achieved its ends through political action that modified Turkish law through legislation. Aslan shows that discrimination may be better observed in the state's use of administrative tools than in legal pronouncements alone. After the attempted coup in 2016, the Turkish state has vigorously attacked minority rights, highlighting Aslan's central claim: political

and social mobilizations are essential to securing pluralism in modern Turkey. As of this writing, the prospects for pluralism are bleak.

Nosheen Ali's chapter observes an interesting feature of identity politics that is often left unremarked in the literature. Even before the creation of Pakistan, some major Islamic writers, including Iqbal, demanded a consensus around the idea that Ahmadis are not Muslims. This immediately suggests that the creation of a state for *all* Muslims was less simple than it initially appeared because there could be indeterminacy in the definition of who was a Muslim, and therefore identification of *all* the Muslims of South Asia. Ali's chapter examines a subsequent stage of the search for progressively purer versions of Muslimness, and a redefinition of a Muslim around an exclusivist and purist Sunni identity that goes on to find Shias of uncertain or questionable status. This is reflected in the widespread violence against Shias in a state that was meant to provide security to all Indian Muslims against the persecution of Hindus. A definition around a religious identity can turn into a problem precisely because it can be defined more and more tightly around narrower definitions of that identity. The force of Ali's argument comes from the theoretical insight: identities can be defined in terms of purity or in terms of grades of intensity. When the latter process unfolds, a dominant subgroup can turn against and persecute groups hitherto considered within the fold with the enormous force of the state. To describe such a scenario, it is important for scholarly vocabulary to be cognizant of the power that permeates difference. Ali therefore encourages the replacement of "sectarianism," a power-neutral concept, with "sectism," which more effectively communicates the normative stakes of the Shia-Sunni relationship in contemporary Pakistan.

The volume closes with Karen Barkey and Vatsal Naresh's comparative analysis of majoritarian domination in Turkey and India. Barkey and Naresh identify majoritarian domination as the transposition of a sociological, enumerated majority upon the idea of majority rule, resulting in the avoidable and arbitrary interference in the basic interests of minorities. They suggest that although India's and Turkey's respective founding moments bequeathed different legacies for the negotiation between democracy and religious pluralism, the two polities have since converged. The fate of religious minorities—and of democracy—hangs perilously in both societies, as well as in Pakistan. This volume offers no predictions or prescriptions. We hope to provide instead a set of historically grounded chapters that help explain the past and present.

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